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SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO
BARGAIN: WORKFORCE CONTINUITY IS
MORE IMPORTANT THAN CONTINUITY
OF ENTERPRISE-SAKS & CO. v. NLRB
A transfer of business ownership often creates a conflict between the prerogative of the purchaser-employer to organize his
own operation and the right of the predecessor's employees to be
protected from unexpected shifts in management.' Implementing
the national policy favoring industrial stability,2 the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) and the federal
judiciary have attempted to strike an equitable balance between
these conflicting interests by applying a doctrine known as successorship.3 Although questions of successorship frequently are

' See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964); Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship-A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 nNN. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1973). The new employer seeks to ensure economic
efficiency in the ongoing enterprise, while the affected employee groups desire continued
employment under favorable conditions. One commentator has characterized these separate
interests as "inherently contradictory [but] mutually dependent." Id. See generally Doppelt, Successor Companies: The NLRB Limits the Options-And Raises Some Problems, 20
DE PAUL L. REV. 176 (1971).
2 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964); Tom-A-Hawk
Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir. 1969); Slicker, supra note 1, at 1102.
See generally Slicker, supra note 1; Note, Successorship and the Duty to Bargain
with the Incumbent Union: A Re-Examination of the Concept of Substantial Continuity,8
Sw. U.L. REv. 138 (1976); Note, AppropriateStandards of Successor Employer Obligations
Under Wiley, HowardJohnson, and Burns, 25 WAYNE L. Rv. 1279 (1979); Comment, Bargaining Obligations After Corporate Transformations,54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 624, 642-49 (1979).
The successorship doctrine was introduced by the NLRB pursuant to its congressional mandate to fashion federal law "from the policy of our national labor laws," see Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957), and thus exists as a matter of federal labor
common law. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1964).
Successorship should be distinguished from the "single employer" and "alter ego" doctrines which also were developed by the NLRB and the courts to safeguard the collective
bargaining rights of employees and to preserve industrial peace. Under the single employer
test, four factors are considered to determine whether the operations of nominally distinct
employers are sufficiently integrated to justify treating them as a single entity for bargaining
purposes. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv., Inc., 380
U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam); e.g., NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979); Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NLRB, 578
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965). These four elements are "interrelation of operations,
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presented in situations involving business reorganizations effected
through agreements between predecessor and successor employers,4 the issue may arise in many other contexts as well. For
example, one company may replace another through competitive
bidding,5 or a shift in management may be occasioned by an employer's loss of a sales franchise.6
Traditional successorship principles, however, have been expanded, and the courts have demonstrated even greater tendencies
to address labor problems from the perspective of the duty sought
to be imposed. 7 For example, if there is a "substantial continuity of
common management, centralized control of labor relations and common ownership." South
Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800, 802 n.3
(1976) (per curiam) (quoting Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v.
Broadcast Serv., Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam)).
While the single employer test presumes the coexistence of two or more business entities, the alter ego doctrine presupposes a discontinued business. The doctrine binds a new
employer to the labor obligations of the former business when the successor is deemed
"merely a disguised continuance" of the predecessor. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB,
315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942). In order to establish alter ego status, the Board and the courts
require that the corporate transformation producing the surviving entity be motivated by
anti-union animus, see, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, 325 F.2d 68, 70-71 (6th
Cir. 1963), and that the original employer retain control over the business, see NLRB v. Bell
Co., 561 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1977). Where alter ego status is shown, the successor and
predecessor are treated as the same employer. Thus, the former is subject to all the legal
and contractual obligations of the latter. See, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, 325
F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 282 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960); NLRB v.
Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
Changes in the business entity may involve a purchase of assets, e.g., NLRB v. Security-Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1976); a corporate reorganization such as
a merger, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); an incorporation
of a former partnership, e.g., Dickey v. NLRB, 217 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1954); or a leasing of
the business, e.g., NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921
(1976); NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952).
6 See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Emerald
Maintenance, Inc. v. NLRB, 464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972).
6 See, e.g., Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969).
7 E.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262 n.9
(1974); Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d
307, 320-22 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Slicker, supra note 1, at 1103;
see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964). In Howard Johnson, the
Supreme Court articulated factors which must be considered in determining whether an
employer is obliged to fulfill any given duty of successorship:
[T]his inquiry requires analysis of the interests of the new employer and the employees and of the policies of the labor laws in light of the facts of each case and
the particularlegal obligation which is at issue, whether it be the duty to recognize and bargain with the union, the duty to remedy unfair labor practices, [or]
the duty to arbitrate ....
417 U.S. at 262-63 n.9 (emphasis added); see Dynamic Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 1195,
1204 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977); Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of
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the business enterprise," a new employer may be required to remedy unfair labor practices committed by the prior employer," or to
arbitrate claims under the old collective bargaining agreement.9
Whether a new employer will be required to assume the duties of
his predecessor, however, depends upon the obligation to be imposed.1 0 Thus, when the duty to bargain with the incumbent employees' union is at issue, the Supreme Court has indicated that
the primary inquiry is whether there is "continuity of identity of
the workforce." 1 Recently, in Saks & Co. v. NLRB,12 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, finding the requisite continuity,
enforced a bargaining order against an employer who hired a majority of its employees from its former subcontractor.1 3
Saks & Co. (Saks), a retail store chain, operated its Pittsburgh
shop in the same building as a Gimbels Brothers, Inc. (Gimbels)
department store.14 The Saks store provided an alterations service
15
for women's garments and subcontracted this work to Gimbels.
Gimbels employed thirty-five alterations workers, eighteen of
whom worked solely on the Saks alterations."' Gimbels had recognized the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (the
Union) as the exclusive bargaining representative of these employees since 1937.17
In June 1976, Saks decided to terminate its operation within
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d 307, 321 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
913 (1975).
a Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973); Perma Vinyl Corp., 164
N.L.R.B. 968, 969, 65 L.R.R.M. 1168, 1169 (1967), enforced sub nom. United States Pipe
and Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968).
0 E.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550-51 (1964).
10 See note 7 supra.
11 See note 42 and accompanying text infra.
12 634 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1980).
13 Id. at 687.
14 Id. at 683. Gimbels has owned all of Saks' capital stock since 1924. Although the
companies file consolidated income tax returns, they are operated independently, and have
separate officers and labor relations policies. Id.
15 Id. The cost of the alterations employees' social security taxes and premiums for
unemployment and workmen's compensation was borne by Gimbels. Saks paid Gimbels for
the cost of the alterations service, including a portion of the cost of fringe benefits for the
Gimbels employees who worked on Saks garments. Id.
16 Id. Gimbels employed a manager of operations to supervise all the alterations employees. Additionally, a supervisory employee of Saks assumed responsibility for work done
on Saks garments. Id.
17 Id. The most recent collective bargaining agreement extended from February 16,
1976, to February 15, 1979. Id.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:539

the Gimbels store."' Moreover, because it planned to establish its
own alterations department at its new location, Saks informed
Gimbels that it no longer would subcontract its alterations work."e
Saks agreed, however, to interview the displaced Gimbels alterations employees for possible employment at the new store.2" Following interviews, Saks hired twenty employees for its alterations
department, including sixteen of the former Gimbels workers.21 At
Saks' new store, this department was expanded to include men's
and children's garments.2 2
Shortly before Saks relocated, its senior vice-president notified
the Union that it would not be recognized as the collective bargaining representative of the alterations employees at the new
store.2" The NLRB, however, found that Saks was a successor employer to Gimbels with respect to the alterations employees,24 concluding that Saks had violated the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Act) 25 by its refusal to bargain with the Union.2"
A divided Second Circuit panelP2 7 adopted the Board's finding
of successorship and upheld the order, compelling Saks to bargain
with the Union.28 Writing for the majority, Judge Bonsal found
28

Id.

19 Id. at 683-84.
20 Id. at 684.
21

Id.

Id.; see note 32 infra. Although the former Gimbels employees' salaries initially remained unchanged, Saks later unilaterally altered their working conditions and fringe benefits. 634 F.2d at 684.
23 Id.
22

24

Id.

Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
26 Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 247 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 103 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1980). The Board
found that Saks' refusal to bargain violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. Section
8(a)(1), provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7]." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 7 of the Act gives employees the right to organize, join, or
assist labor unions. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). The NLRB also determined that Saks violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) by setting the terms and conditions of employment of the
alterations employees after refusing to bargain with the union. 247 N.L.R.B. No. 128, 103
L.R.R.M. 1241 (1980).
27 Judge Friendly joined Judge Bonsal's majority opinion. Judge Meskill filed a dissenting opinion.
28 634 F.2d at 687. The panel, however, unanimously denied enforcement of the Board's
order with respect to Saks' establishment of different conditions of employment. Id. at 68788. The dissenting judge agreed with the majority that a successor employer is free to set
25
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that the prime consideration in determining the bargaining obligations of an employer toward an incumbent union was whether
there had been "substantial continuity in the identity of the
workforce." 2 The court determined that the proper measure of
workforce continuity in duty to bargain cases is "whether a majority of the successor's bargaining unit is composed of the predecessor's employees. 30 Observing that most of the alterations employees
hired had been a part of the Gimbels unit, the court concluded
that Saks succeeded to the collective bargaining duty of Gimbels
with respect to these workers.31 Judge Bonsal rejected Saks' contention that a finding of successorship was inappropriate in light of
the expansion of Saks' alteration department, because the work to
be performed was virtually the same as that previously performed
at Gimbels. 2
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Meskill asserted that the majority's decision expanded the successorship doctrine beyond the limits set by Supreme Court precedent.3 3 Despite his agreement with
the initial terms and conditions of employment, subject to a later bargaining agreement. See
id. at 690 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 684 (citing Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir.
1977)). See also Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249,
262-65 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1972).
30 634 F.2d at 685. Although the court noted a lack of "clear guidance from the Supreme Court," see id. at 685 & n.3, it found support for its measure of workforce continuity
in the decisions of other circuits. Id. at 685-86. Additionally, Judge Bonsal distinguished the
Second Circuit's prior decision in NLRB v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 526 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.
1975). There the court had stated that successorship obligations could be imposed where a
majority of the predecessor's unit was hired. Id. at 824. The Saks majority dismissed that
statement, reasoning that in Bausch & Lomb, "the issue of which test to apply was not
before us since none of the predecessor's employees had in fact been hired." 634 F.2d at 685
n.2.
31Id. at 686.
32 Id. Judge Bonsal noted that the addition of men's and children's clothing alterations
represented a minimal change in employment conditions and, thus, was insufficient to prevent a finding of successorship. Id. (citing NLRB v. Middleboro Fire Apparatus, Inc., 590
F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Interstate 65 Corp., 453 F.2d 269, 272-73 (6th Cir. 1971)).
3 634 F.2d at 688-89 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 296 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). Judge Meskill asserted
that the majority holding would encourage successor employers to hire just few enough of
the predecessor's employees to avoid a bargaining duty. 634 F.2d at 690 (Meskill, J., dissenting). It is submitted, however, that such a result would be unlawful under section 8(a)(3) of
the NLRA which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Indeed, the Board and the courts
have utilized section 8(a)(3) to proscribe the refusal by a successor employer to hire employees of his predecessor, where the refusal was motivated by a desire to avoid successor obligations. K.B. & J. Young's Super Markets v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463, 465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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the basic premise that continuity of the workforce is a primary
consideration in duty to bargain cases, 4 Judge Meskill insisted
that "the overall test to be met is whether there has been 'substantial continuity of identity of the business enterprise.' "5 He asserted that the majority's approach effectively eliminated the several other factors traditionally deemed necessary to a finding of
continuity of enterprise and, thus, of successorship.3 6 To find successorship, he argued, there must be a showing of something beyond a "mere migration" of employees from one employer to another.8 7 Based upon his analysis of precedent, Judge Meskill
asserted that he would require, in addition to the majority's test,
either that there be a transfer of assets accompanying the migration of employees,38 or that the new employer retain most of his
predecessor's employees, thus leaving the bargaining unit largely
intact.3 9
389 U.S. 841 (1967); Mason City Dressed Beef, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 735, 747-48 (1977), modified on other grounds sub nom. Packing House & Indus. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 688
(8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Foodway of El Paso, 201 N.L.R.B. 933, 938-39, 82 L.R.R.M.
1637 (1973), enforced, 496 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1974); Tri State Maintenance Corp., 167
N.L.R.B. 933, 935 & n.6 (1967), enforced, 408 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Piasecki Aircraft
Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 348, 350, 43 L.R.R.M. 1443 (1959), enforced, 280 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961). In Piasecki, the successor employer hired few
enough of the predecessor's employees to avoid a duty to bargain under NLRA section
8(a)(5). 123 N.L.R.B. at 349, 43 L.R.R.M. at 1444; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Although
the Board did not find a violation of section 8(a)(5), it held that the successor's failure to
hire additional employees of the predecessor was motivated by its desire to avoid a duty to
bargain collectively with the incumbent union. 123 N.L.R.B. at 350, 43 L.R.R.M. at 1444.
Thus, a violation of section 8(a)(3) was established and the successor was ordered to bargain
with the representative of the predecessor's employees. Id. Piasecki subsequently was cited
with approval by the Supreme Court. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406
U.S. 272, 280-81 n.5 (1972). It must be pointed out, however, that at least one commentator
has suggested that the existing section 8(a)(3) remedy does not sufficiently safeguard the
bargaining rights of the employees of a predecessor employer. Murphy, Successorship and
the ForgottenEmployees: A Suggested Approach, 31 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 75 (1978). Since it
is difficult to establish a successor employer's motivation for a refusal to hire his predecessor's employees, this commentator urges that the courts and the Board establish "a doctrine
that failure to rehire the predecessor's employees is a presumptive violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act." Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
" 634 F.2d at 688 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (citing Nazareth Regional High School v.
NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1977)).
'5 634 F.2d at 689 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 688 n.1 (Meskill, J., dissenting); see note 67 and accompanying text infra.
17 Id. at 690 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
19 Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting). The dissent cautioned that where neither of the two circumstances were present, application of successorship principles would encourage discrimination against union members. Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting). See note 33 supra.
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It is submitted that the Saks court's emphasis upon workforce
continuity in duty to bargain cases comports with Supreme Court

precedent and national labor policy. In NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,4 ° the sole Supreme Court decision
involving a duty to bargain, the Court upheld an NLRB bargaining
order where the predecessor employer had been ousted by competitive bidding and the new employer's workforce was composed primarily of employees from the predecessor. 1 In reaching its determination, the Court stated that where a majority of the employees
hired by the new employer is represented by a recently certified
bargaining agent, and the bargaining unit remains largely intact,
there is no basis for refusing to order the new employer to bargain
with the incumbent union.4 2 The decision in Saks, therefore, would
appear to be consistent with Burns, since sixteen of the twenty
employees hired by Saks had been employed
previously by
4S
Gimbels and worked under similar conditions.
The Saks decision not only finds support in Burns, but also is
consistent with the labor policy that an employer must bargain
with a representative who has the support of a majority of the
workforce. Under the National Labor Relations Act,44 a union is
40 406 U.S. 272 (1972).

Id. at 275, 279. In Burns, the predecessor employer, Wackenhut Corporation, provided security services for the Lockheed Aircraft Service Company. Id. at 274. Shortly
before Wackenhut's contract was to expire, Lockheed requested bids from companies supplying security services. Id. at 275. Three months prior to the bidding, however, a majority
of the Wackenhut guards selected an exclusive bargaining representative in a NLRB election. Id. at 274. Prior to placing its bid, Burns was informed of the union certification. Id. at
275. Having provided the low bid, Burns replaced Wackenhut. It retained 27 of the Wackenhut guards and hired 15 of its own. Id. at 272.
42 Id. at 280-81. This proposition has been followed consistently by the courts and by
the NLRB. NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1980); Nazareth Regional
High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Security-Columbian
Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921 (1976); Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d 307, 321 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975);
Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838
(1974); Slicker, supra note 1, at 102-04, see NLRB v. Polytech, Inc., 469 F.2d 1226, 1230
(8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center, Inc., 465 F.2d 1039, 1041-42 (6th Cir.
1972); W.T. Grant Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 955, 956-57, 80 L.R.R.M. 1591, 1591 (1972); Denham
Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 434, 443-44 (1970), modified, 469 F.2d 239 (1972), af'd, 218 N.L.R.B. 30,
89 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1975); Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer,
63 Nw. U.L. REv. 735, 793-99 (1969).
4 Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1980).
44 Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
41
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conclusively presumed to have this support for 1 year following a
certification election, or for "a reasonable time" after the employer
voluntarily recognizes it as the bargaining representative of the
unit. 45 After such period, the employer can rebut this presumption
by casting a good faith doubt on the union's support.4 6 In succesbe the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
'5 When a union achieves exclusive bargaining representative status by a certification
election it is conclusively presumed to enjoy majority support for 1 year. NLRB v. Massachusetts Mach. & Stamping, Inc., 578 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1978); Teamsters Local 769 v.
NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Retired Person's Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d
486, 489 (2d Cir. 1975); Orion Corp. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1975); see Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954). Similarly, a union that receives lawful voluntary recognition
is entitled to an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for a reasonable period of time
not exceeding 1 year. Authorized Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899, 907 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 767, 769
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); e.g., Pick-Mt. Laurel Corp. v. NLRB, 625
F.2d 476, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 582
F.2d 135, 150 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed
Stone, Inc., 474 F.2d 1380, 1383 (2d Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1330 (3d
Cir. 1970); NLRB v. San Clemente Pub. Corp., 408 F.2d 367, 368 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1969) (per
curiam); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 399 F.2d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 1968); Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1263, 90 L.R.R.M. 1481, 1482 (1975); Keller Plastics Eastern,
Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587, 61 L.R.R.M. 1396, 1397 (1966).
" Authorized Air Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Sahara-Tahoe Corp. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); see NLRB v. Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., 474 F.2d
1380, 1383-84 (2d Cir. 1973). Unless the employer rebuts the presumption by demonstrating
that the union in fact has lost majority backing or by establishing good faith doubt concerning continued majority status, he remains under a duty to bargain with the union.
To establish good faith doubt of the union's majority status, "the employer must present clear and convincing evidence of loss of union support capable of casting reasonable
doubt of the union's continuing majority." Retired Person's Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d
486, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1975). The Board generally has held that allegations of minor employee
dissatisfaction with the union do not raise good faith doubts of the union's majority status.
E.g., Pick-Mt. Laurel Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1261-62, 100 L.R.R.M. 1236, 1237, 1257,
1261-62 (1979), enforcement denied on other grounds, 625 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1980); PreEngineered Bldg. Prods., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 841, 841 n.1, 96 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1977), enforcement denied on other grounds, 603 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1979); C.M.E., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B.
514, 522-23, 92 L.R.R.M. 1634 (1976). Similarly, diminution in unit size is insufficient to
rebut the presumption, Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 879-80 (2d
Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921
(1976); Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
838 (1974), nor is employee dissatisfaction with a particular strike or union policy, Retired
Person's Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1975); Retail, Wholesale & Dep't
Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
In NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), the Supreme Court,
in imposing a duty to bargain on a successor employer, focused upon the recent certification
of the employees' collective bargaining agent. Id. at 278-79. The Court's emphasis on this
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sorship cases, where great emphasis is placed on the policy interest
in stable bargaining relationships, this presumption is used to justify imposition of the duty to bargain upon the new employer. 7
Thus, where a majority of the successor's employees had been employed by the predecessor, the courts and the NLRB presume that
these workers desire continued representation by the incumbent
union.'8 Indeed, courts have stated in the past that a mere change
in employers should not indicate that the employees' support for
the union has diminished. 49 It is submitted therefore, that the
Saks holding can be justified through this presumption. Moreover,
if in fact this presumption is erroneous, the employees can always
seek decertification in accordance with the procedures outlined in
section 9(c) of the Act.50
It is conceded that the formula espoused in the Saks' dissenting opinion also can be justified through the presumption of continued majority support. It is submitted, however, that Judge Meskill's requirement that a majority of the predecessor's employees
be retained by the successor is too strict in light of the policy confact has engendered speculation that the lack of recent certification may raise a good faith
doubt as to a union's majority status. See Note, Contract Rights and the Successor Employer: The Impact of Burns Security, 71 MIcH. L. Rav. 571, 575-76 (1973); The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 50, 252 (1972). Courts that have considered the question have held, however, that a mere absence of certification will not sustain a finding of
good faith doubt. See Valmac Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 246, 247-48 (8th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921 (1976); NLRB
v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 411
U.S. 912 (1973).
47 See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 & n.3 (1973);
NLRB v. Edjo, Inc., 631 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1980); Dynamic Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 552 F.2d
1195, 1204 n.10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977); Nazareth Regional High School
v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921 (1976); M & H Mach. Co., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 102
L.R.R.M. 1038 (1979); Half-Century, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 100 L.R.R.M. 1547 (1979).
48 See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972); Pacific Hide
& Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921 (1976); NLRB v. Daneker Clock Co., 516 F.2d
315, 316 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025,
1027 (7th Cir. 1969).
49 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972); NLRB v. Auto
Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d
284, 286 (1st Cir. 1954); Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 437, 442, 53 L.R.R.M. 1068,
1069 (1963).
50 National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976). The rebuttable
presumption of continued majority support does not prevent employees from seeking decertification in appropriate situations. E.g., Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1139
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
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siderations involved in duty to bargain cases.51 The purpose of imposing a duty to bargain on a "successor" employer is to protect
workers from sudden shifts in employment policy occasioned by a
change in management.5 2 Indeed, employees can legitimately expect that their elected or recognized representatives will continue
to be their agents in dealing with management.5 3 Thus, it is submitted that the formula of the Saks majority furthers these policies in that it expands the successorship doctrine to encompass a
greater number of "sudden shifts in management.""
The central conflict between the views of the judges of the
Saks panel, however, involved more than determining which of two
mathematical formulas was preferable. The basic disagreement in
Saks concerned the emphasis to be placed on the element of
workforce continuity in successorship cases.5 5 Although Judge
51If Judge

Meskil's formula were adopted, the new employer would be obliged to bargain with an incumbent union, absent a transfer of assets, only if he retained a majority of
his predecessor's employees. See 634 F.2d at 690. One commentator has suggested that this
approach can create absurd results. For example, he notes, if the new employer reduced the
total workforce to less than 50% of the predecessor's unit, he would have no duty to bargain
even if he had hired only from that unit. See Comment, BargainingObligationsAfter Corporate Transformations, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 624, 646 n.151 (1979).
11 The main purpose of the successorship doctrine is to allow business reorganizations
while protecting employee rights and promoting industrial peace. NLRB v. Security-Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1976). It has been noted, however, that "the
basic aim and purpose of successorship in the bargainingcontext" is to promote the security of employees when management changes occur. Slicker, supra note 1, at 1090-91 (emphasis added). Thus, the underlying policy problem in these cases is whether the change in
the nature of the employment relationship is sufficiently substantial so as to vitiate the
employees' original choice of bargaining representative. 541 F.2d at 138-39; see Pacific Hide
& Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1977); Slicker, supra note 1, at 1103.
53 Section 7 of the Act provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right ...
to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
Although there appears to be some conflict in the circuits as to which formula correctly measures workforce continuity, the ratio applied by the Saks court seems to comport
with the weight of authority. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hudson River Aggregates, Inc., 639 F.2d
865, 870-71 (2d Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Pre-Engineered Bldg. Prods., Inc., 603 F.2d 134, 136 n.2
(10th Cir. 1979); Valmac Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 246, 247-48 (8th Cir. 1979); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 664, 669 n.29 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1070 (1979); Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549
F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 4 n.6 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 921 (1976); NLRB v. Daneker Clock Co., 516 F.2d 315, 316 (4th Cir. 1975);
Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d 307, 319
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Makela Welding, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d
40, 45-46 (6th Cir. 1967); Goldberg, supranote 42, at 794; Slicker, supra note 1, at 1103. But
see Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 263-64 (1974);
Dynamic Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 1195, 1203-04 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827
(1977); NLRB v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 526 F.2d 817, 824-25 (2d Cir. 1975).
Compare 634 F.2d at 684 (Bonsal, J., writing for majority) with id. at 689 (Meskill,
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Meskill agreed that continuity in workforce identity is a "primary
factor," he asserted that this criterion should not dominate the
"overall test"-whether the identity of the business enterprise was
substantially continued. 8 Judge Meskill based his argument, in
part, on John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 7 where the Supreme Court held that in appropriate circumstances an employer
may be required to arbitrate under a collective bargaining agreement signed by his predecessor.5 8 Such circumstances, the Court
indicated, could be found when there is a "substantial continuity
of identity in the business enterprise before and after a change" in
employers. 59 Judge Meskill's reliance on Wiley, it is submitted,
suggests a failure to perceive the distinction between an employer's
duty to arbitrate a claim arising under a preexisting collective bargaining agreement and the obligation to bargain with the representative of a legally cognizable bargaining unit.6 0
It is suggested that Judge Meskill's emphasis on identity of

the business enterprise is not appropriate in duty to bargain cases.
Such an approach results from attempting to apply the successor-

ship label without fully considering the legal obligation sought to
be imposed. Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned against

straining to find a sweeping definition of successor which would
apply in every legal context.6 Thus, it is suggested, the relevant
criteria for determining successorship must depend upon the duty
sought to be imposed. 2 When the question is the existence of a
J., dissenting).
11Id. (Meskill, J., dissenting).
57 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
Id. at 551.
19 Id.
60 Judge Meskill conceded that in Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d
873, 879 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit focused upon workforce continuity. 634 F.2d at
688 (Meskill, J., dissenting). He asserted, however, that the case also involved a transfer of
assets, thus evidencing continuity of enterprise. Thus, he contended, that Nazareth and
Wiley, see notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra, properly emphasized the "business
enterprise" approach. See 634 F.2d at 690 (Meskil, J., dissenting). It is submitted, however,
that the Nazareth court did not demonstrate any great concern with a transfer of assets.
Indeed, in imposing the duty to bargain, the court relied principally upon the presumption
of continued majority status, see 549 F.2d at 879-80, thus focusing upon workforce continuity. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, it is suggested, Judge Meskill's reliance on Wiley is misplaced, for that case is distinguishable. Wiley involved a duty
to arbitrate, not a duty to bargain. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,
550 (1964); notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
" See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262-63
n.9 (1974); note 7 and accompanying text supra.
.2
The Second Circuit appeared to recognize that the Saks holding could be limited to

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:539

duty to arbitrate a preexisting grievance, other factors indicating

continuity of the business enterprise may be more significant than
workforce continuity.6 8 This is because the obligation to arbitrate
arises under the contract between the predecessor employer and

his employees." Thus, in the arbitration context, while retention of
a majority of the predecessor's employees can be a factor, it is submitted that an element of greater importance is a transfer of assets, or some other indicator of the continuing nature of the business entity. 5 In contrast, it has been recognized that in duty to

bargain cases, the new employer's obligation should be construed
by looking to the workforce since the critical question is whether
majority support for the union still exists. 6 Thus, although the
Board and the courts may consider other factors in determining
whether a duty to bargain exists,6 7 the essential requirements are
the precise legal duty involved. Judge Bonsa stated that "where the question is simply one
of the successor's duty to bargain,... the appropriate test of continuity is whether a majority of the successor's bargaining unit is composed of the predecessor's employees." 634
F.2d at 685 (emphasis added).
" Although continuity of the business enterprise can be evidenced by looking to the
identity of the workforce, see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551
(1964), it has been recognized that a stronger showing can be made by focusing upon a
transfer of assets. See Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
504 F.2d 307, 322 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d 307,
319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); see John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 & n.5.(1964); Slicker, supra note 1, at 1074-86.
65 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964); Boeing Co. v.
International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d 307, 322 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); see, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Pennetech
Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 614-17 (D. Maine 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978);
Local 1115 Joint Bd. Nursing Home v. B & K Investments, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1203, 1208-09
(S.D. Fla. 1977); Eastern Freight Ways, Inc. v. Local No. 707, 300 F. Supp. 1289, 1292
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), af'd, 422 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
" See notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra.
67 In determining the obligations of successor employers, the Board and the courts have
considered whether
(1) there has been a substantial continuity of the same business operations; (2) the
new employer uses the same plant; (3) the same or substantially the same
workforce is employed; (4) the same jobs exist under the same working conditions;
(5) the same supervisors are employed; (6) the same machinery, equipment, and
methods of production are used; and (7) the same product is manufactured or the
same services offered.
Border Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 814, 815, 83 L.R.R.M. 1606, 1608 (1973); accord, NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921 (1976);
NLRB v. Dent, 534 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Daneker Clock Co., 516 F.2d
315, 316 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Teamsters Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d
956, 963 n.40 (3d Cir. 1976); J-P Mfg., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 965, 968-70, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216,
1218 (1972); see Slicker, supra note 1, at 1054-63. See generally Goldberg, The Labor Law
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continuity of the workforce and appropriateness of the bargaining
unit.68 Indeed, where continuity of the workforce has not been
found, courts have refused to enforce bargaining orders despite the

presence of many other factors pointing to continuity of the business enterprise.6 9
CONCLUSION

In Saks, the Second Circuit recognized that any successorship
determination must be made by analyzing the legal duty sought to
be imposed. The central focus in duty to bargain cases is whether
the presumption of continued majority support is justified. Thus,
the court correctly held that "substantial continuity in the identity
of the workforce" is the primary factor to be considered in determining whether to impose bargaining obligations upon a successor
employer. Finally, it is suggested that the measure of workforce
continuity endorsed by the Second Circuit-whether most of the
successor's employees were hired from the predecessor unit-best
evidences continued majority support while ensuring that employees are protected when changes in management occur.
Michael G. Santangelo

Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 735, 746-74, 793-806 (1969);
Spelfogel, Labor Liabilitiesin Purchases,Acquisitions and Mergers: The NLRB's Successor
and Accretion Doctrines, 21 LABOR L.J. 577, 578 (1970).
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serve., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1972); see note 42
and accompanying text supra.
" E.g., Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 611-14 (9th Cir. 1977)
(purchase of plant, same work, same equipment, same skills, but no continuity in
workforce); NLRB v. United Indus. Workers of the Seafarers Int'l Union, 422 F.2d 59, 62-63
(5th Cir. 1970) (business was leased, but no continuity in workforce); NLRB v. John Stepp's
Friendly Ford, Inc., 338 F.2d 833, 836 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1964) (transfer of assets and continuity of business operations, but no continuity in the workforce); Bengal Paving Co., 245
N.L.R.B. No. 163, 102 L.R.R.M. 1374, 1375 (1979) (transfer of assets but no continuity in
the workforce).

